The argument is that sanctions, which display the same characteristics as siege warfare, are condemnable against just war principles, because they are targeting innocent bystanders and thus that they should be subject to the same moral objectives of siege warfare. Although it is argued that sanctions are not 'intending' to kill, but rather are intended as a non violent alternative to war, and so sanctions cannot be compared to a form of warfare and critiqued on ethical criteria of a 'just war', sanctions can still be morally objected because the stakes that are being waged in sanctions are much higher than in warfare, because in waging war, this is done because survival is at stake, whereas sanctions are normally being used to uphold international law, human rights: "the stakes and the justificatory context are quite different". The argument is that sanctions warrant being tolerated, because of the importance of international norms, which they are intended to protect, however, doesn't make sense, in that international law is being enforced through means that are violating international law itself.

You can further dispute ethical sanctions on the basis that the human being instrumentalised as a means of achieving a change of policy is contrary to deontological ethics, where all human beings are characterised by 'dignity', whereby their value is irreplaceable, and cannot be replaced, or exchanged with other things without loss. Using humans as a 'means' to achieve something is against their right of dignity. Therefore, if a populations is being made to suffer for any reason other than to prevent death of lives, such as for the political interest of a foreign state, or to uphold a norm, it is incompatible with deontological ethics. Although she

SO if sanctions are being used to prevent further deaths, deontological critique of ethics wouldn't work

Sanctions that are consented to by the population are not defensible by deontological arguments